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‘Fully Capable of any Iniquity’: The Zangroniz Family’s Atlantic Human Trafficking 
Network 
 
By focusing on the business network of the Zangroniz family firm, this article argues 
that it was thanks to the disposition to evolve, diversify, and take advantage of new 
business opportunities, that a number of slave trading firms and entrepreneurs were 
able to challenge British abolitionism across the Atlantic basin. The article argues 
that as a result of its vast Atlantic network of agents and correspondents the Basque 
family at the center of this study was able to turn their business model into a 
globalized enterprise with offices, interests, and investments in Europe, Africa and 
the Americas.  
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This article focuses on the rise and expansion of slave trading merchants originally based in 
Havana, but who were to have a truly international impact on communications, finance, and 
trade – chiefly of human beings – throughout the nineteenth century. It does so by focusing 
on the trading house established by two Basque brothers in the Cuban capital in the early part 
of the century, and then following the expansion and diversification of their business 
activities and the creation of a transatlantic commercial network. This successful network 
transformed them into important actors during a period that was signaled by technological 
innovations that “made it possible to transport more and different kinds of items across great 
distances,” thus leading to a greater economic integration in the Atlantic world.1   
By charting the development of the Zangroniz family business – a scholarly enterprise 
that will also involve the partial examination of many of their partners – this article offers a 
case study that will allow us to address and answer some broader historiographical and 
theoretical questions, pertaining to economic history as well as to the modus operandi of 
transatlantic slave traders. Engaging with the literatures of enterprising and family business in 
the Iberian Atlantic in the Age of Revolution, it uses a merchant house managed from a 
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booming nineteenth-century Atlantic urban center – Havana – to shed light on the importance 
of adopting new strategies of diversification as a route to success in a highly risky and 
competitive environment.2 Over the past years several studies have begun to examine the 
business models adopted by European slave trading firms and entrepreneurs in the eighteenth 
century and early nineteenth century, while the slave trade remained legal throughout the 
Atlantic world.3 Nevertheless, we currently have a very limited knowledge about the ways in 
which some of these firms and entrepreneurs morphed their operations into new business 
models, and even less is known about the new firms and entrepreneurs, many of them 
Spanish, Portuguese, French, American, Cuban and Brazilian, that joined the human 
trafficking business precisely as it was declared illicit by most of the former slave trading 
nations in the first half of the nineteenth century.4 
I have purposely chosen the Zangroniz clan to shed light on a number of essential 
issues to the development of Atlantic commercial networks, because of two main reasons. 
Firstly, the information existing about them, although by no means abundant, is substantial 
enough as to map their trajectory in time and space, throughout the century and across 
continents. Secondly, because they were exceptional in the sense that they were constantly in 
the search for new business ventures, it is possible to observe their expanding operations and 
networks, their strategies of diversification, and the ways in which they invested in new 
markets and businesses, often taking significant risks and doing so at the margin of local and 
international laws. Nevertheless, and in spite of their obvious important role as international 
slave dealers throughout the first half of the century, little has been written about this family 
of human traffickers. By all means, the generations of Zangroniz examined in this article, 
epitomize the figure of the astute and pioneering capitalist of the time, flexible and resilient, 
and often eager to take advantage of any opportunity without having too much regard for 
anything but for the possible margin of profits to be earned with every one of their business 
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initiatives. As many of their contemporaries, they traded human beings across oceans and 
seas without ever having second thoughts on the suffering they caused. Their actions, as those 
of their competitors and partners, resulted in new generations of Africans being enslaved and 
forced to cross the Atlantic during the era of the illegal slave trade, in turn, extending slavery 
in Cuba for two generations. 
 Over the first half of the nineteenth century these relatively unknown Basque 
entrepreneurs, went from having a small business in a distant island across the ocean, to 
creating an extensive transatlantic commercial web. Although, they did trade on a large 
variety of products and at some point even founded their own transatlantic steam ship 
company, the Zangroniz firm became first and foremost notorious for their continuous 
involvement on the traffic of human beings. It was precisely thanks to their success in 
establishing extensive kinship and networks correspondents and agents that they managed to 
prosper in the face of British policing pressures in the Atlantic basin. For that, they took 
advantage of every single opportunity that was presented to them, regularly colluding with 
local governments and rulers from several countries and territories. Ultimately, by studying 
the case of the Zangroniz family business model, this article also sheds light on some of the 
strategies widely used by slave traders in the Atlantic world during the period of illicit trade 
to circumvent the abolitionist efforts carried out by Britain and other governments.5 The 
article also proposes further lines of inquiry into the stratagems devised by similar capitalist 
entrepreneurs to succeed where others failed, and in the face of a very risky and highly 
competitive business. 
Basque slave traders in Cuba 
When the pioneers of this Basque migration began to arrive in Cuba in the late eighteenth 
century, there was a palpable appetite for free trade among Havana-based merchant and 
planter elites. This longing for free trade had become patent after the British occupation of 
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Havana in 1762–1763, which had stimulated the local economy as no other event did until the 
final decade of the century.6 Although free trade was not officially granted until the 1810s, 
Cuban-based merchants had been carrying out a de facto trans-imperial trade from the 1790s, 
notably with the United States, as a result of Spain’s own limitations to satisfy the demands 
of the island’s expanding economy. Over the years, and in order to get away with this 
borderline illegal behavior, the authorities, planters and merchants of Havana, in unison, 
resorted to various excuses and threats to justify the exceptionality and need for these 
measures. In reality, however, trans-imperial trade soon became a regular feature rather than 
an exception, in Cuba as well as in other Spanish American colonies. 
In this new trading scenario, just as many other merchants across the Iberian Atlantic 
had done, Havana-based merchants took advantage of new conjunctures to further their 
business interests. Due to a combination of political, social and economic reasons, in the 
1790s Cuba was better placed than most of the other Spanish colonies to take advantage of 
the events that from 1791 transpired in the neighboring French colony of Saint Domingue. 
Although the Spanish colonies in the Americas had been importing larger numbers of African 
slaves than we had previously assumed, the increase in the transatlantic slave trade to Cuba 
that took place after the final decade of the eighteenth-century was, by any standards, a major 
one.7 
As the Spanish Asiento went into disuse, Havana-based merchants began taking the 
reigns of the slave trade from the early 1790s, when they sent their first expedition to Africa, 
the frigate Cometa, which returned with 227 Africans belonging precisely to a Basque 
merchant and planter, Sebastián de Lasa.8 In the following years, Spanish peninsular 
merchants developed new transatlantic networks based on interpersonal trust, which allowed 
them to take control of one of the most lucrative, although by no means risk-free, business of 
the time.  
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 A number of scholars have studied Iberian Atlantic networks in the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century, discussing issues as diverse as the role of communications and trust, 
and also exposing the possible pitfalls that studies like these may pose. Xabier Lamikiz, for 
example, has emphasized how interpersonal trust was “crucial to early overseas trade.”9 
Notably, he has also discussed how this need for trust between merchants and agents (the 
principal-agent problem) led many of them to rely first and foremost in family members.10 
Both Lamikiz and Jeremy Baskes have also pointed out that whenever family members were 
not available, ethnic and regional common identities, otherwise known as paisanaje, were the 
next logical type of association.11 Thus, as in the case presented in this article, Basque 
merchants and traders, associated first and foremost with other Basques, creating in Havana 
something that came to resemble a clique of paisanos.  
 Although, most of the recent studies of Iberian Atlantic networks focus on an earlier 
period to that discussed here, they do raise a number of methodological issues that are worth 
exploring because of their potential parallels with the period of the illicit slave trade that 
followed British Abolition in 1807. The existing historical sources to study cases like that of 
the Zangroniz family firm are, for the most part, scarce. It is not surprising, then, that in spite 
of all the power and affluence of these nineteenth-century slave traders, few studies of 
particular individuals and firms exist.12 As Lamikiz suggests, this lack of sources may be due 
to the “canniness of early modern merchants led them to keep their records as secret as 
possible.”13 However, the very illicit character of their business, especially after 1820, makes 
researching into their business transactions even more difficult. In this respect, and as 
Christopher Ebert argues while referring to Atlantic contraband – also an illegal activity 
fraught with similar problems – in the early modern period, these studies must inevitably be 
of a qualitative nature due to the almost insurmountable problems associated with quantifying 
trade which was both unlawful and guarded from the public eye.14 
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The beginning of the Haitian Revolution, then, signaled a unique opportunity for 
Havana-based planters and merchants to seize control of the sugar and coffee markets by 
replacing Saint Domingue’s production and exports. As a result a new wave of emergent 
capitalist entrepreneurs began arriving in Cuba with the intention of making quick fortunes. 
Many among them probably migrated as they escaped the wars that engulfed Europe at the 
time. More broadly, they all benefitted from political events that were concurrently taking 
place on both sides of the Atlantic, sometimes probably unknown to them, from Bourbon 
reforms aimed at stimulating trade and manufacturing in Spain and its American colonies, to 
internal wars in African states which led to the thriving of slave markets by the African 
coast.15 
Chiefly, among those who arrived at the time, there were considerable numbers of 
Basque, Catalonian, and Galician young ambitious men, keen to get a slice of the profits that 
were to be made from the fast-growing sugar and coffee industries.16 It is probably worth 
noting here that this was a transatlantic migration that, as some historians have pointed out, 
took these men to virtually every corner of Hispanic America.17 While many of them ended 
up owning or working on plantations, some others linked up with the well-established Spain-
born merchant community that existed in Havana and other Hispanic American cities at the 
time, and embarked on new careers as goods traders.  
 Although in principle it would seem that these Basque migrants had moved from a 
European center to the colonial periphery of the island of Cuba, the reality could not be 
farther from this assumption. By the turn of the nineteenth century Cuba had become the 
fastest growing economy in the Caribbean and one of the leading exporters of agricultural 
products – mainly sugar – and importers of African slave labor. Havana was then a thriving 
metropolis, a port center for trade with several daily commercial ship arrivals from virtually 
every single Atlantic port. When this generation of Basque migrants settled there, they 
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unsuspectedly joined a productive, commercial, and technological sugar-related revolution 
that would soon turn the island into one of the largest and most prosperous colonies in the 
Atlantic world.  
 From the late 1790s onwards many prominent Basque entrepreneurs invested in 
Cuban sugar. According to José Manuel Azcona Pastor, “All of them were slave traders as 
well as import-exporters.”18 Among them were representatives of the Abarzuza, Aldama, 
Bengoechea, Goicuría, González Larrinaga, Iriarte, Irigoyen, Lasa, Martiartu, Pérez de Urria, 
Zangroniz, Zavala, and Zulueta clans. Before long, many of them married into wealthy local 
families, and on occasion they married among themselves, as it was the case of the González 
Larrinaga and Pérez de Urria families. These marriages often offered an added value to 
already existing corporative alliances, and in the long run, cemented the position of these 
families within the local elites.19 Instead of becoming rivals, these paisanos often came 
together as business partners, benefitting from their common historical and cultural 
backgrounds. In this way, for example, Tomás de Irigoyen and Silvestre Iriarte formed a very 
successful slave trading partnership in the late 1830s and early 1840s, while Julián de Zulueta 
and Salvador Martiartu often conducted business together in the same period.20   
Juan José Zangroniz, the patriarch of the family studied in this article, was one of 
those who arrived in Havana around the turn of the nineteenth century. Juan José had been 
born in the tiny hamlet of Etxabarría, near the village of Marquina (today Markina-Xiemen), 
in 1784. Apparently, he had lived all his life in the area, until he decided to cross the Atlantic 
in search of better fortunes. Very little is known of his business associations before this time. 
Upon his arrival in Cuba he settled in Havana and immediately began doing business there. 
Like many of his compatriots, Juan José married a local girl from a well-off local Basque 
family. In 1808 Juan José and María de los Angeles Allende y Salazar tied the knot, and by 
1816 the couple had had three small children.21 Although Juan José’s business undertakings 
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did not take off right away, a lucky incident changed his and his family’s destinies in 1805. 
That year, Juan José won the considerable sum of 20,000 pesos from the Royal Lottery of 
Our Lady of Guadalupe of Mexico, and soon afterwards a notable increase in his business 
activity became apparent.22 
This sum also allowed Juan José to travel to his village of Marquina, near Bilbao, that 
same year to visit his relatives and to close some pending business transactions he had 
there.23 Thanks to this newly found fortune, Juan José was joined in Havana in 1813 by his 
younger brother Juan Bautista (b.1791), who by his side soon became an important merchant 
in the Cuban capital as well.24 Over the next few years the names of both Juan José and Juan 
Bautista began appearing more and more on trading transactions conducted in Havana. For 
example, in 1809, Juan José bought a vessel in the United States with the intention of using it 
for commercial purposes, and between 1811 and 1814 he was involved as a consignee in 
various mercantile expeditions of different kinds organized in Cuba.25 More to the point, 
already in 1811 he was doing business with one of the most notorious Basque slave traders of 
Havana, Juan Magin Tarafa.26 Meanwhile, in his shadow, his brother Juan Bautista was also 
carving a career as a trader and by 1815 he appeared for the first time in the historical 
sources, when he was obliged to explain how one of their vessels had been lost at sea.27   
Around this time they set up the firm of Zangroniz, Hermano y Cía (Zangroniz, 
Brother and Co.), which would continue to exist in one way or another until the mid-1860s, 
carried forward by two members of the second generation, Juan José’s sons named Juan José, 
born sometime between 1809 and 1813, and Ignacio María (1816–1881), who would in turn 
become two of the most renowned slave traders of the nineteenth-century Atlantic world. 
Upon his death in 1843 in Dahomey, Juan José Junior would leave a racially mixed son 
named Francisco, who was still a respected member of the local elites in Whydah several 
years after his father’s death.28 Another descendant of the family patriarch named Jean Joseph 
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Joachim (1847–1901) continued to trade in Europe, mostly in France and England, until the 
arbors of the twentieth century.  
Expanding the Network: The Transatlantic Slave Trade 
All the surviving evidence seems to suggest that after his visit to Santander in 1815, Juan 
José never returned to Cuba on a permanent basis, and instead remained in Spain, later on 
settling in Bordeaux and subsequently in Bayonne, where he was soon to become one of the 
main Spanish merchants in both cities. This decision was perhaps a result of political events 
occurring at the time. 1815 signaled the end of the Napoleonic Wars, and thus it was perhaps 
a propitious moment for Zangroniz to settle in France in order to take advantage of the 
French commercial links with Africa vis-à-vis the slave trade. When he died years later in 
1844, he was still living in Bayonne and fully involved in the operations of the family firm 
that by now was in the hands of his son Ignacio María. It was precisely during his time in 
Spain, just before moving to France, that Juan José’s and his family’s slave trading ventures 
began.   
 It is not clear why Juan José failed to return to Cuba in 1816. There’s very little 
information about this time in his life and that of his closer relatives. We know that when he 
undertook this journey to Spain in 1815, either him, his wife María de los Angeles Allende, 
or one of their three children seemed to have been ill.29 The fact remains that Juan José 
decided not to return to Havana and instead sent his brother Juan Bautista back across the 
Atlantic to take care of the family business in Cuba. By 1819 Juan José, now identified in the 
documents as Jean Joseph de Zangroniz, had naturalized French and was a resident in the Rue 
du Chapeau-Rouge, in central Bordeaux.30 
 Juan José organized his first known slave trading expedition from Bilbao in 1816. 
That year he teamed up with the firm of Lemonauria and Pérez to send the corvette Flora to 
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Africa to buy slaves and take them to Havana, where his brother Juan Bautista would be 
waiting for them.31 One year later, Juan José organized his second registered slave trading 
expedition and the first fruitful one we know of. This time, the ship Mulato departed from the 
Galician port of La Coruña in 1817 and a few months later successfully landed 319 Africans 
in Havana. The next few known voyages were all planned in Bordeaux between 1820 and 
1825, and all procured their slave cargoes in places as diverse as Saint Louis, Bonny and 
Elmina.32 These early slave trade voyages followed the operational patterns exhibited by 
other Havana-based slave trading firms of the time and may have been the direct result of the 
materialization of business links with American slave traders.33 Not only were the 
expeditions planned and sent to Africa from European ports like Cádiz, Barcelona, or 
Bordeaux, but once at sea, the ship captains acquired their human cargoes from already active 
agents posted along the West African coast. As we will soon see, this modus operandi would 
change in the 1830s when the second generation of Zangroniz took over the family firm and 
transformed it into a massively profitable business, having their own private agent posted in 
one of the largest slave trading ports of West Africa.  
[insert Table 1 here] 
In contrast to his sons’ later behavior, Juan José seems to have been averse to taking 
excessive risks and he ran the family firm within certain restrictive business parameters, even 
in those occasions when he financed illegal slave trading expeditions after 1820. According 
to Eric Saugera by the mid-1820s “Zangroniz put an end to these ever riskier [slave trading] 
expeditions, but remained in business. In 1825, he established a regular lining connection 
between Bordeaux and Havana, assuring travelers that they would be perfectly nourished and 
fed.”34 A year before, in 1824 Juan José, had also founded a maritime company in Bordeaux, 
who had as a representative in Paris and the rest of France a certain Monsieur Lataillades, 
who was probably also a Basque compatriot.35  
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 As mentioned above the business model of Zangroniz, Brother & Co. was about to 
change. From the mid-1830s the involvement of both Juan José and Juan Bautista diminished 
significantly, although they both remained active partners of the family firm. While Juan José 
focused on his French businesses, which by now included different ventures, Juan Bautista 
became a planter near Matanzas, where in 1824 he bought extensive lands belonging to the 
Hacienda La Sagua to foment a sugar plantation.36 We know that in 1841 Juan Bautista 
obtained a privilege from the Crown to introduce a new type of sugar manufacturing 
innovation appliance, which leads us to believe that ever since his nephews had taken over 
the slave trading business, Juan Bautista had instead focused on his plantation in Matanzas.37 
From the existing evidence it is possible to conclude that from the 1820s various members of 
the Zangroniz clan specialized in different but related branches of business, perhaps as a 
strategy to prevent losses. 
The next Zangroniz generation was mainly formed by two of Juan José’s sons, Juan 
José Junior, and Ignacio María. When they took over the business sometime in the early 
1830s they set out to expand its operations following the business model established by other 
large-scale Havana-based slave traders, like, for example, that of the firm of Blanco & 
Carvallo, who had sent one of their own – the renowned slave trader Pedro Blanco – in the 
mid-1820s to West Africa, to set up a slave factory by the river Gallinas, in what is today the 
Kerefe river region in Sierra Leone and Liberia.38 There is little doubt that by this time the 
Zangroniz, Brother & Co., were well on their way to becoming a successful business firm, 
since as Jeremy Adelman has maintained, the most successful merchants of that time 
“operated on a large scale through a network of agents scattered around many trading 
centers.”39  
 Already in 1830 Zangroniz, Brother & Co. were reported to have sent a vessel to 
Whydah, in the kingdom of Dahomey. Although this voyage seems to have been mostly the 
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work of Juan Bautista, the destination suggests that Juan José Junior, who was now in his late 
teens or early twenties, might have been involved too. British commissioner in Havana 
William Sharp Macleay informed in that year that the American brig Lyon – which eventually 
sailed under Spanish colors – had left for Africa on July 27, consigned to the house of 
Zangroniz, Brother & Co.40 Referring to this vessel upon its return to Havana in March 1831, 
Macleay wrote that although much mystery remained about the ship and its cargo – he 
thought the vessel had likely been involved in a reported act of piracy off the coast of Africa 
– he still suspected it to be a slaver. One of the things that made him think this way was the 
fact that the ship had been dispatched by Zangroniz, Brother & Co., “a mercantile house, 
which, from all I have been able to learn, is fully capable of any iniquity.”41 
 The Whydah connection was soon to blossom. Since at least 1833 one of the 
Zangroniz brothers, Juan José Junior, moved to that African city and began trading in slaves 
there, alongside some of the most famous slave traders of the period. While Juan José settled 
down in Whydah, his brother Ignacio María took the reins of the family firm headquarters in 
Havana. Around this time, the Zangroniz brothers already counted with a vast network of 
agents and correspondents across the Atlantic, many of whom were close relatives or 
paisanos. In addition to having their father in Bordeaux, they had a cousin named Juan 
Allende sailing back and forth from Havana to Whydah as a the captain of slave vessels, and 
they had established strong business connections in London, where, according to a British 
consular officer in Rio de Janeiro, their bills were “well known in many mercantile places.”42 
These bills were also “readily negotiated at Bahia for produce or British ‘dry goods’.”43 As a 
matter of fact, we know that Juan José Zangroniz Junior travelled from Whydah to Salvador, 
using the Portuguese version of his name, João José, in January 1835, staying there for a 
couple of months, setting up commercial links for the benefit of his family firm.44 When he 
returned to Whydah at the end of March he had added some lasting business partners to those 
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he had before this trip. Among those was Vicente Paulo e Silva, a Brazilian resident in Bahia, 
who according to Pierre Verger had been involved in the transatlantic slave trade at least 
since 1809, with whom he conducted business there in more than one occasion over the next 
few years.45   
The details of the modus operandi of a specific slave trading expedition organized by 
Juan José Zangroniz from Whydah in 1836 were revealed by him in a letter to the captain of 
his slave ship Carlota. In this letter, Juan José gave very precise instructions to captain 
Miguel Palau on how to carry out business. He insisted that he should live on good terms 
with his officer and crew, making sure that they all got paid what they were owed. He then 
commanded Palau to head for the south coast of Cuba aiming for Cayo Piedras, where he was 
expected to hoist a blue flag and wait for a medical doctor to come aboard to check the health 
of the Africans. After doing so, he should go to the creek of Majana, where he should 
disembark the slaves “with the greatest expedition,” sending a man to contact local planter 
Gregorio Menéndez, who in turn should contact his brother Ignacio María Zangroniz in 
Havana to come and collect the Africans.46  
The attention to detail shown by Juan José Junior in this missive is extraordinary and 
reveals a number of new strategies developed by slave traders at the time in order to cope 
with the British patrolling of the Atlantic. Among those stratagems was the use of foreign 
flags to deceive British cruisers, and the choice of particular navigation routes once they had 
reached the coastline of Cuba in order to expedite the process of disembarkation of the 
Africans.47 This attention to detail and their willingness to take ever-bigger risks – at least six 
of their slave ships were seized by British cruisers between 1833 and 1839 – transformed the 
house of Zangroniz into a market leading transatlantic firm by the second half of the 1830s, 
that counted with partners and correspondents across places as diverse and faraway as 
Havana, Salvador de Bahia, Whydah, Bordeaux, and London, among many others.48   
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By 1835 or 1836 Juan José Junior had cemented his position as one of the foremost 
slave traders along the African coast. From this time and until his death in 1843, he was 
continuously referred to as a leading slave trader in Whydah, second only to Francisco Felix 
de Souza.49 In a letter to Viscount Palmerston in early 1837, British Mixed Commissioners in 
Freetown H. D. Campbell and Walter Lewis referred to Zangroniz as one of the most 
important slave traders in West Africa, alongside his partner de Souza, famously known 
throughout the Atlantic as King Ghezo’s Cha Cha.50 While discussing the case of the 
schooner Latona, seized with over 320 Africans on board they commented that the “...names 
of two well known persons engaged in slave-adventures, De Sowsa, alias Char Char, of 
Whydah, and Zangroni, appear in the transactions connected with the employment of this 
vessel.”51 
In a report produced that same day, Campbell and Lewis gave yet more information 
about Juan José Junior, reproducing the testimony of the ship’s captain, Jozé Gervasio de 
Carvalho, who in this occasion referred to Zangroniz by his Portuguese name: “The Owner 
and lader [sic] of the slaves is João José Zangroni, merchant of Havana, but at present trading 
on the Coast.”52  
There is very little room for doubt that during this period Juan José Zangroniz junior 
was deemed to be almost as important as De Souza, to the point that it was not strange for the 
British commissioners in Sierra Leone to have former captains of captured slave vessels 
solemnly swear specifically not to trade again with “De Souza, Zangroni, or to any other 
slave merchant” of that coast.53 As a matter of fact there’s sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
that, as Robin Law has argued before, Zangroniz and De Souza rather than enemies, soon 
became business partners. In the Report of the schooner Jack Wilding, in 1839, the British 
commissioners in Sierra Leone pointed out that one of the letters confiscated in 1839 referred 
to a previous slave trading voyage, that of the General Manso in 1834. The letter contained 
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“an account of goods delivered to J. T. Zangronis and Francisco Felix de Souza, alias Char-
char, at Whydah, from the ‘General Manso’ in 1834, showing that Capo’s connections with 
these persons is of old standing.”54 
Equally, while giving testimony before the British Parliament Select Committee on 
the West Coast of Africa in 1842 Reverend John Beecham read a letter dated on June 4, 
1842, written by a Captain Laurence in Sierra Leone, referring to the involvement of Whydah 
on the slave trade at the time. When discussing the most important slave merchants in this 
port, the letter only mentioned two names, arguably placing that of Zangroniz even above that 
of De Souza: “This, I have no hesitation in saying, is the most formidable [slave trading] 
place on the whole coast (…) Whydah itself is in charge of the headman Zangroni; the noted 
slave dealer De Souza resides there.”55 
Simultaneously, in Havana, Ignacio María took care of putting together slave-trading 
expeditions that sailed from Havana on a frequent basis, often with Basque captains in charge 
now sent almost exclusively to Whydah. He also took care of receiving these expeditions 
upon their return, and of selling the Africans sent by his brother. Ignacio María also attained a 
reputation as a leading slave trader throughout the Atlantic, and at least among 
commissioners and judges of the Mixed Commission courts of Havana and Freetown, he was 
a well-known offender. In 1840, while discussing the case of the Portuguese brig 
Emprehendedor, commissioners Macaulay and Doherty referred to the Zangroniz brothers as 
joint owners of the vessel together with De Souza. Upon interviewing the captain of another 
captured ship, the Casoalidade, Joaquim Antônio, he observed that he knew “the owners of 
the vessel, who are the brothers Zangrony, of whom one resides in Havana, and the other at 
Whydah, and both of whom are Spanish.”56 
 In 1843, as business thrived even in the face of renewed British pressures, their highly 
profitable commercial operation in human beings received a massive setback. That year Juan 
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José Junior died unexpectedly. British missionary Thomas Birch Freeman, who visited 
Dahomey in the early 1840s mentioned Juan José Zangroniz’s death and funeral in the entries 
for February 3 and 4, 1843, in his personal diary. According to Freeman, Zangroniz, who had 
been “one of the principal slave dealers at Whydah,” was buried in the Portuguese burial 
ground of Whydah.57 Confronted with the loss of his brother and firm’s agent in Africa, 
Ignacio María resolved to continue to trade in African slaves, often using his cousin Juan 
Allende to command his slave trading expeditions. For example, according to British Consul 
in Havana, Joseph T. Crawford, a cargo of more than 300 slaves was landed near the Cuban 
capital in March 1844, with “all the slaves belonging to Mr Sangronis.”58 
However, after his brother’s death, things began to change significantly. In September 
1844 Juan Allende was caught in charge of the Spanish brigantine Audaz, and subsequently 
he was put to trial in Sierra Leone.59 Even before being captured, Allende had found himself 
arriving in Whydah without having his cousin to negotiate the cargo on his behalf. Instead he 
was forced to engage in a negotiation with Antonio Sanmartí, a Catalonian trader who had 
been active in Whydah since at least 1838 and who appears to have become the main Spanish 
slave trader there after Juan José Zangroniz’s death.60 When Allende requested a slave cargo 
from Sanmartí, he was advised to continue to Onim, where Estevão José Bruxedo (or 
Brochado) had just set up a new factory in partnership with Domingos José Martins and the 
Ferruja brothers.61 Sanmartí also advised Allende to accept any cargo he was given, and to 
follow Brochado’s suggestions, even if these suggestions went against his original aim of 
taking a slave cargo to Cuba as instructed by his cousin Ignacio María.62  
So far there is no conclusive evidence to support any sort of involvement of the 
Zangroniz, Brother & Co. firm on the slave trade after the mid-1840s. It is, however, 
unlikely, that Ignacio María stopped his involvement altogether, even after the deaths of his 
father and brother. Some circumstantial evidence, nevertheless, seems to suggest otherwise. 
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Particularly poignant in this respect was the testimony of the British Consul Crawford, who 
in the mid-1850s still considered Ignacio María’s anxiety to introduce laborers in Cuba 
“superior to all the considerations of humanity.”63  
Abolition and the Need for Diversification 
After the death of Juan José Junior in Whydah in 1843, Ignacio María began to trade mostly 
on his own, although at least until the late-1850s the company kept the name of Zangroniz, 
Brother & Co., mostly due to the fact that some of his brothers, cousins and brothers-in-law 
continued to be involved in the business, albeit in a more marginal way. There is evidence 
that he remained in touch with his relatives in France, sometimes carrying out business 
together, and that he also remained in touch with his nephew Francisco in the Bight of Benin. 
Perhaps due to the death of his brother and subsequently that of his father a year later in 
1844, or due to the British abolitionist push of the early 1840s he seems to have thought that 
the transatlantic slave trade had its days numbered. Consequently, Ignacio María, probably 
after consulting his brother Ramón Anacleto, slowly but surely began a process of 
diversification of his mercantile operations, gradually moving away from the transatlantic 
slave trade and into other forms of human trafficking. In this respect, he became a pioneer 
among those who, like him, had been heavily involved in the traffic of human beings from 
Africa, and who were now considering varying alternatives to this trade, which was coming 
under more and more pressure from the British.  
Following this new pattern, Ignacio María attempted a number of fresh and very risky 
human trafficking business ventures, most of which were doomed to failure. From the 
existing sources, it is possible to assert that he was most likely the only among the main 
Havana-based slave traders of the period to try his hand at each of the four major alternatives 
existing at the time to get cheap or free labor, namely the trade in ‘free’ African laborers, 
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Mexican indigenous workers (both free and war prisoners), Canary Islands colonists, and 
Chinese indentured laborers.  
Ignacio María’s ventures were often undertaken in tandem with former or new 
business partners, and in some cases they never really fructified. In late 1853 he presented an 
official request to the Crown to allow him to introduce in Cuba 5,000 African free 
“apprentices” to be used in agricultural works.64 When a Royal Order denied this request in 
April 1854, Ignacio María turned his attention closer to home.65 Taking advantage of an 
opportunity presented to him and his partner house of Goicuría & Brothers.66  
 This opportunity seems to have arisen in 1854 when a surplus of prisoners from the 
Caste Wars that had been raging in Yucatán since 1847, led the Mexican government to 
consider making a grant to the houses of Goicuría & Brothers, and Zangroniz, Brother & Co., 
to obtain the services of these prisoners of war as indentured laborers for a period of five 
years. The British agents in Mexico City, Veracruz, and Havana successfully challenged such 
a murky deal from the beginnings of 1855. This challenge eventually led the Mexican 
government to admit the illegality of their actions and to cancel the privilege of trafficking 
war prisoners to Cuba. These enforced changes, however, did not affect the transportation of 
what they deemed to be free, volunteer laborers.67    
 As a matter of fact, according to the British Consul in Mexico City, Percy W. Doyle, a 
fresh contract was promptly signed between the Mexican government and Tito Vecino and 
José Temes, the agents in Yucatán of these two Havana-based firms.68 Consul Crawford 
reporting from Havana also informed the Earl of Clarendon that the contracts to import 
Yucatán Indians into Cuba had been signed by the houses of “Messrs. Goicuría Brothers and 
Zangronis Brothers, of this city” with non-other than General Manuel López de Santa-Anna, 
President of Mexico at the time.69 Similarly, in an attempt to justify the legality of this 
transaction, the Mexican minister of Government, Manuel Diez de Bonilla, wrote to Consul 
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Doyle in Mexico City, letting him know that the contract was legal and binding, and that they 
were allowed to transport these laborers “to the Isle of Pines, Porto Rico, St. Thomas, or the 
Island of Cuba” where they could be freely engaged in jobs on the domestic service, on the 
fields, workshops, roads or factories.”70  
 In a follow-up letter, Consul Doyle informed Diez de Bonilla that he believed his 
government to be basically engaged in a covered operation of slave trafficking. Consul Doyle 
pointed out that some of those “Indians” sent to Cuba had been embarked at Sisal and 
Mérida, and that just before that, they had been sent there “guarded, and chained together 
until they were put on board the vessel which was to take them to Havana.”71 Simultaneously, 
in Havana, Consul Crawford blamed both the human trafficking merchants and the Spanish 
government for colluding to allow this new sort of human trade to prosper. In his own words, 
the “anxiety to obtain the introduction of labourers” by the Spanish authorities in particular, 
was “superior to all considerations of humanity.”72  
 As it happened, this business venture did not produce the financial benefits 
anticipated by the Goicuría and Zangroniz firms. Consul Crawford in Havana noticed how 
their investment had gone all into financing the privilege and premiums of importing laborers 
that subsequently were not in demand by Cuban planters, who did not consider them to be 
strong and fit enough as to work on their plantations. Crawford also informed how many of 
them had died of cholera, and how the others had been left lying in a farm that had been 
purposely rented to host them until they could be sold, and where maintenance and medical 
expenses had dented any hopes of achieving a profit from this enterprise.73 By early 1856, 
Crawford satisfactorily concluded that the business was considered to be “at an end.”74    
After the Yucatán enterprise had failed, the Zangroniz, Brother & Co. firm, by this 
time also owning a steam ship company in San Juan de Puerto Rico that carried items and 
people between the Spanish Caribbean and Europe, began looking to other alternatives that 
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would allow them to take full advantage of the demand for labor existing on the ever growing 
and expanding sugar Cuban industry.75 Around 1864 Ignacio María, now acting almost 
entirely on his own, was one of the many entrepreneurs involved in the ongoing efforts of 
introducing ever larger numbers of white colonists from various regions of Spain, and in 
particular from the Canary Islands into Cuba.76 Since at least 1860 the firm had changed 
name to Ignacio María Zangroniz y Cía (& Co.), in order to reflect the fact that by this date 
Ignacio María was its almost absolute owner and senior partner. During this period, he seems 
to have focused most of his efforts on the introduction of Chinese indentured laborers, his last 
human trafficking undertaking. The introduction of Chinese laborers in Cuba had been a 
booming business since the first Chinese arrived in the island in 1847. Ever since, a number 
of Cuba-based entrepreneurs, many of them also Basque, continued to foster this trade, 
amassing large fortunes in the process.77 Between 1863 and 1865 Ignacio María imported 
large numbers of Chinese contracted workers to work on Cuban plantations, rivaling for a 
while some other well-established traffickers based in Havana at the time. It is also apparent 
that in order to carry out this new venture, Zangroniz also linked up with relatives and friends 
living in Bordeaux and Bayonne, since the vessels used for this trade were all French.78  
Conclusion: Beyond the End of the Slave Trade 
When Ignacio María Zangroniz died of phthisis in the middle of the Atlantic during a return 
voyage to Cuba from Bordeaux in 1881, most of his family’s vast business had vanished. In 
1879 before he wrote his will, he had sold most of his business and had barely kept a number 
of properties and New York City bonds which, in the absence of descendants, he bequeathed 
to some of his relatives in France, and to an African named Pedro Arará, who had been in his 
service for over 40 years.79 Although the death of Ignacio María also constituted the end for 
the family firm first established by his father and uncle in the 1810s, the legacies of their 
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aggressive sort of commercial model persisted in some of those places where the Zangroniz 
conducted business.  
 In West Africa, Francisco Zangroniz followed the lead of his father and together with 
the renowned slave dealer Yekpé Zinsou established a new slave-trading factory in 
Cotonou.80 His descendants are numerous today in the Republic of Benin, where they have 
changed their name to Sangronio. In Bordeaux and Bayonne, the Zangroniz also prospered 
throughout the nineteenth century. One of them, Jean Joseph Joachim became a renowned 
grower and distiller of brandy, selling his products across Europe with the catchy add on of 
officially being appointed to such a profession by the Royal Court of Spain.81 Although Jean 
Joseph Joachim was based in Bordeaux he was also part of the Birmingham commercial elite 
at the end of the century, and was often present at soirees and receptions, toasting to the 
health of the queen, dancing, singing and reciting verses.82  
 The advent of the nineteenth century brought enormous political, economic and 
technological changes to the modern world, nowhere more so than in the Atlantic basin. As 
Hopkins has stated this was a period of growth for “finance, services and pre-industrial 
manufacturing;” a period ripe for those willing to take risks and adopt state-of-the-art 
technological innovations.83 These men were not frightened to take excessive risks or to 
invest on new unproven markets, often losing capital in the process; and neither were they 
averse to diversify their operations, investing on new commercial ventures throughout the 
years. Between the early 1810s and the late 1870s, the Zangroniz family firm went from 
conducting a small commercial operation in Havana to becoming leaders in the illicit traffic 
of human beings across the Atlantic world. Beyond this central human trafficking business, 
they also speculated on, and invested in, various other projects, including sugar plantations, 
transatlantic transportation of people, production and export of ice, wines, hides, and other 
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minor products, and they had confirmed interests in the form of bonds and bills of trade in the 
major business centers of the world at the time, namely, London, Paris, and New York. 
 It was precisely thanks to this pioneering spirit of investment, adaptation, and 
diversification that the Zangroniz not only survived, but thrived under the constant and 
relentless British pressures. Their lack of scruples, their willingness to carry out any sort of 
merciless business in order to succeed where others had failed, and their ability to collude 
with partners, correspondents, and corrupt authorities across the Atlantic set them apart as 
classic representatives of what Steven Watts has referred to as the “early capitalist culture” 
that developed in the West from the 1790s onward.84 Finally, it should be pointed out that 
with many other Atlantic business companies of this period, the Zangroniz were also able to 
succeed thanks to what Manuel Llora-Jaña has recently defined as a necessary “strong family 
support.”85 This combination of factors made of Zangroniz, Brother & Co., a truly 
transnational family firm in an increasingly globalized world.     
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